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With the increased dependency on web applications through mobile devices, malicious attack 
techniques have now shifted from traditional web applications running on desktop or laptop 
(allowing mouse click-based interactions) to mobile applications running on mobile devices 
(allowing touch-based interactions). Clickjacking is a type of malicious attack originating in 
web applications, where victims are lured to click on seemingly benign objects in web pages. 
However, when clicked, unintended actions are performed without the user’s knowledge. In 
particular, it is shown that users are lured to touch an object of an application triggering 
unintended actions not actually intended by victims. This new form of clickjacking on mobile 
devices is called tapjacking. Much of the research work has focused on developing 
mitigation techniques on web application level clickjacking issue. However, none of the 
research has thoroughly investigated attacks and mitigation techniques due to tapjacking in 
mobile devices. In this thesis, we identify coding practices that can be helpful for software 
practitioners to avoid malicious attacks and define a detection techniques to prevent the 
consequence of malicious attacks for the end users. We first find out where tapjacking attack 
type falls within the broader literature of malware, in particular for Android malware. In this 
direction, we propose a classification of Android malware. Then, we propose a novel 
technique based on Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) to identify possible tapjacking 
behavior in applications. We validate the approach with a set of benign and malicious 
android applications. We also implemented a prototype tool for detecting tapjacking attack 
symptom using the KLD based measurement. The evaluation results show that tapjacking 
can be detected effectively with KLD.  This thesis is organized in the following format: a 
classification of Android malware, a survey of mitigation techniques, a discussion of our 
proposed KLD-Based approach, and an application implementation. 
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Motivation, Problem Statement, and Contribution 
 
1.1 Overview 
With mobile applications, the user’s actions are always passed back to an activity. An activity is 
a representation of a screen or view. Tapjacking takes advantage of this process by initiating 
methods when a user gestured user interface (UI) elements in the activity. These can cause 
damage in a variety of ways. Some methods simply aim to be a nuisance by changing the user’s 
mobile phone background. Other methods can be much more detrimental by changing the user’s 
mobile phone lock password and taking over control of a mobile application or device. Figure 1 
shows three UI elements that could trigger hidden malicious code: the Sign in button and the two 
editable text fields Email and Password. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of Android application that shows three UI elements 
 
1.2 Motivation 
Little work has been done on understanding the scope and extent of tapjacking attacks within 
mobile devices. Moreover, end users do not have any protection to reduce unwanted 
consequences caused by tapjacking. The most affected individuals are those who are not aware 
of the characteristics of possible malware. Malicious code triggers activities which could be as 
simple as copying user input from a text field to infinitely running a program in the foreground 
without user knowledge. Most mobile application developers are oblivious to the importance of 
security within their mobile applications. There are many potential losses when taking into 
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account that many mobile device users access their bank accounts, school information, and daily 
schedules using applications.  
 
Most mobile applications require access to very sensitive user information, such as birthdates, 
physical and mailing addresses, and other uniquely identifiable information (such as the device 
International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI)). The IMEI is the "social security 
number" of the mobile device. When considering a mobile application such as Facebook, 
tapjacking attacks would provide access to a user’s most personal information and photos, as 
well as a list of the user’s family and closest friends. Within LinkedIn, a user’s business contact 
information, current employer, and professional profile are heavily exposed. For example, a 
malicious attack could post unflattering information on a LinkedIn user’s profile. These are just 
few examples of tapjacking threats to Android mobile applications. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Tapjacking allows malicious developers to completely hijack a mobile device or to simply 
perform malicious acts. In addition, if malicious mobile applications have unnecessary 
permissions to the mobile device, then they can perform even more malicious activities. 
Fortunately, most security experts are able to scan for unneeded permissions and prevent 
applications from being published into their respective App Stores. However, if mobile users 
decide to download applications from unknown sources, and enable permissions, then they open 
themselves up to vulnerabilities. In this thesis, detection and mitigation techniques for tapjacking 
malware are explored so that mobile users have a chance to check mobile applications before 
installing to their devices. By detecting malicious code before installation, mobile users will have 
a peace of mind in the safety of the personal information and their mobile devices. 
 
This research is intended to answer the following question:  
 
Given that we have an access to both legitimate and malicious applications performing a 






1.4 Research Methodology 
 The research methodology involved an intensive literature review of over 30 papers involving 
malware detection in Android mobile applications and the overview of the Android operating 
system. We identified the primary detection techniques such as sandboxing, machine learning, 
and permission analysis based methods. In identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each 
technique, we were able to determine appropriate measures to detect malware with the least 
disadvantages. Our literature review concluded with the KLD-based approach and its newfound 
popularity in security mechanisms.  We also performed an experiment to evaluate our proposed 
KLD-Based approach with a metric-based approach. 
 
Our analysis included the identification of the required source code and permissions that would 
allow us to perform some very popular malicious actions. By linking the source code and 
permissions, we were able to determine the intention of source code by checking the permissions 
in the application’s Android Manifest file and reviewing the results of the static code analysis. 
Each application’s functionality is tied to a permission and set of elements. We identified the set 
of elements and permissions required for our SMS case study. The next step in our process was 
to devise a way to decompile and analyze mobile applications in a secure environment before 
computing the occurrence probability. We then implemented a java application that allows the 
user to select an Android application, decompile the application to readable source code, and 
analyze the application using our developed prototype class. Our application implementation 
produces a CSV file that includes the data from our KLD-Based approach. Using the data, we are 
able to compute the KLD value for each of the evaluated Android applications in relation to the 
known good Android application. Using this method, a user is able to accurately determine the 
malicious nature of an Android application with the least error.  
 
1.5 Contribution 
This work addresses the stated research question by performing an in-depth study of tapjacking 
attacks and applications that are responsible for these attacks. In particular, emulating tapjacking 
attacks with a mobile application and understand the application code elements including API 
call patterns and permissions causing tapjacking attacks. This work also identifies a new 
detection technique based on Kullback-Leibler Divergence metric in an effort to help not only 
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mobile application developers, but also end users who may not have any technical knowledge on 
tapjacking attack. More specifically, the contributions of this work include the following: 
a) An overview of the Android Operating System (OS) and a classification of Android 
malware, understanding the code level and permission level features (Cooper et al. 2014) 
that are responsible for malicious activities (Chapter 2) 
b) A survey of literature work intended to mitigate malware activities during application 
development and deployment stages, discuss the importance of mobile device security 
and user information, outline common vulnerabilities in mobile applications (Chapter 3) 
c) A KLD-Based approach to differentiate between malware and good applications based on 
source code level features and apply the concept to detect suspected malware (Chapter 4)	  
d) An explanation of the application implementation for our KLD-Based approach, 








2.1 Technology Overview 
Android has become the leading smartphone OS in the world with staggering sales figure of 60 
million phones in the third quarter of 2011, 50% market share (Aaron, 2011). A recent study 
shows that more than 50% of Android mobile have unpatched vulnerabilities, opening them up 
to malicious applications (malware) and attacks. A compromised smartphone can inflict severe 
damage to both users and the cellular service provider. Malware applications can make the phone 
partially or fully unusable, cause unwanted billing, steal private information, or infect every 
name in a user’s phonebook (Reza & Mazumder, 2012). 
 
Recently, a malware affected more than 100,000 Android devices in China (known as 
MMarketPay). This malware is a hidden application that appeared to be legitimate and is 
designed to purchase applications and contents without the consent of the device users (victims). 
As a result, victims saw a staggering amount of bills (Baldwin, 2012). The incident prompted 
Google, the developer of the Android OS, to introduce stricter rules for applications on Android 
such as naming of applications and banning applications that disclose personal information 
without user permission. An Android Short Message Service (SMS) malware firm was fined 
£50,000 by the UK premium phone services regulator PhonepayPlus (“PhonePay Plus”, 2013). 
An SMS is a text messaging service available on most mobile devices and is a very popular 
choice of communication. 
 
Possible attack targets into smart phones include Cellular networks, Internet connections (via 
Wi-Fi, General Packet Radio Service / Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution (GPRS/EDGE) 
or 3G network, Universal Serial Bus (USB) and other peripherals (Shabtai, Fledel, & Elovici, 
2010). Given all these, it is important to study malicious Android applications and their 
characteristics. A solid understanding of the characteristics of malware is the beginning step to 
prevent much of the unwanted consequences. This chapter is intended to overview the Android 
OS, its architecture, and security threats posed by Android malware. In particular, we focus on 
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the characteristics commonly found in malware applications and understand the code level 
features that may lead to the detection of the malicious signatures for prevention. We also 
discuss some common defense techniques to mitigate the impact of malware applications.  
 
2.2 Android OS 
Android is an open source OS based on the Linux first launched in 2007 and intended for mobile 
phones (Rehm, 2012). Between the two major variants of smartphone (Android and iOS), 
Android is the most popular one. As of October 2013, the latest version of Android OS is 4.4 
(commonly known as KitKat supporting API level 19). Being developed and supported by 
Google, all Android devices allow users to synchronize access to storage and communication 
services provided by Google. For example, users can login to Google Gmail to check email and 
access contact list, calendar, and other free applications automatically. The default desktop of 
Android has five screens that can be switched by tapping. A user can move any icon to any place 
on the desktop by tapping and hovering. Android devices allow users to download and install 
new applications for legitimate purposes that may include game, business, communication, 
photography, and service. The common place to find applications is the Google Play Store 
(“Google Play”, 2013). 
 
The Android Developer manual recommends some common practices for programmers for 
developing applications (“Android Design”, 2013). These include the guidelines for developing 
applications that are visually appealing to users. A developer can reuse standard theme that 
control visual properties of the elements for user interface of an application such as color, height, 
padding, and font size. Recommended guidelines for color and illumination of icons are provided 
to represent different state of an icon (e.g., a gray colored icon means static, illuminated icon 
means “pressed”, 50% illumination means “focused”, 30% of illumination means “disable”). 
Developers can choose different color styles and text font sizes. The guidelines recommend 
using textColorPrimaryInverse and textColorSecondaryInverse for light themes. Also to 
maintain consistency of look and feel in the same UI, it is recommended to use scale-




Legitimate applications support well-known gestures to allow users interacting with applications 
based on the screen objects. Table 1 shows the core gesture set that is supported in Android. 
Unlike desktop or laptop computers, activities and operations can be performed on Android 
devices based on touching (also known as tapping). Note that a "tap" is a brief touch followed by 
the release of touch on a certain entity of Android screen. Usually, “tap” is considered as a single 
event for smartphone device and applicable for a visible icon. Most legitimate applications are 
developed in a way so that useful operations are performed based on user-initiated gestures. 
Nevertheless, some legitimate applications may not need gestures to perform operations (e.g., an 
application that is intended to clear cache data periodically upon installation). For this thesis, we 
can fairly assume that most good applications have a visible Graphical User Interface (GUI) or 
UI elements to enable tapping, and the actions preformed are expected by users. In contrast, for 
malware, a visible GUI may trigger different or hidden actions without the user's knowledge. 
 
Table 1: A List of Gesture Types Supported in Android  
(“Android Design”, 2013) 
Type Description Action 
Touch (tap) Triggers the default functionality for a given item. Press, lift 
Long press 
Enters data selection mode. Allows a user to select 
one or more items in a view and act upon the data 
using a contextual action bar.  
Press, wait, lift 
Swipe Scrolls overflowing content or navigates between views in the same hierarchy. Press, move, lift 
Drag Rearranges data within a view, or moves data into a container (e.g. folders on Home Screen). Long press, move, lift 
Double touch Zooms into content. Also used as a secondary gesture for text selection. 
Two touches in quick 
succession 
Pinch open Zooms into content. 2-finger press, move outwards, lift 
Pinch close Zooms out of content. 2-finger press, move inwards, lift 
 
 
2.3 Android Architecture 
The Android OS framework has a number of layers to facilitate the execution of applications 
(Shabtai et al. 2010). Table 2 shows an overview of the OS framework (“Android Design”, 
2013). The bottom layer has the Linux kernel. On top of the kernel, a set of native libraries 
(C/C++) and the Android virtual machine (Dalvik, which is the Android-specific implementation 
of the Java virtual machine) reside. The Dalvik VM relies on the underlying Linux kernel to 
17 
 
handle low-level functionalities such as process and memory management. The Dalvik VM 
executes .dex files (Dalvik executable), which can be created by transforming Java classes using 
the SDK tools (“Memory Management in Android”, 2010). The next layer is the Application 
Framework encompassing the Java core libraries, which rely on the native libraries. The topmost 
layer contains the Java-based applications that are created using the Application Framework 
layer. Java Applications communicate with the Android Framework through a variety of key 
applications, such as Messaging, Gallery, and the Camera (Shabtai et al. 2010). 
 
Table 2: Architectural Overview of Android OS 
(“Android Design”, 2013) 
APPLICATIONS layer 
Home Contacts Phone Browser 
APPLICATION FRAMEWORK layer 











LIBRARIES ANDROID RUNTIME 
Surface 
Manager 
Media Framework SQLite Core Libraries 
OpenGL | ES FreeType WebKit Dalvik Virtual Machine 
SGL SSL libc 
LINUX KERNEL layer 
Display Driver Camera Driver Flash Memory Driver Binder (IPC) Driver 
Keypad Driver WiFi Driver Power Management Audio Drivers 
 
 
2.4 Security Features 
Android has a number of built-in security features to protect the data and memory that belong to 
processes or applications running on the device (“Security Tips”, 2013). We discuss core 
security features including sandbox, permission-based access control, secure Inter Process 
Communication (IPC), safe memory management, and data encryption.  
 
Sandbox:  
In Android, each application runs on a sandbox (i.e., each process has its own copy of the virtual 
machine). As a result, an application cannot access the data and code of another Android 
application. Sandboxes are regularly used for scanning programs and applications that contain 
unverified developer certificates. Because sandboxing isolates each application, it provides a 
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more stable environment and prevents other applications from being infected from a malicious 
application. 
 
Permission-based access control: 
User-granted permissions for each application are the basis to grant or restrict access to system 
features and user data. During installation of an application, the permissions required to operate 
different peripherals are declared and a user is prompted whether or not he/she intends to 
grant/deny the permission. If a user does not grant any of the needed permission, the application 
is not installed.  
 
Secure IPC:  
An application cannot directly access other application’s memory spaces (containing data). Thus, 
the Inter Process Communication (IPC) mechanism plays a key feature in accessing data from 
one application to another application. A developer needs to implement IPC based on the 
following three steps (“Android IDL Example with Code Description – IPC”, 2013): 
implementation of Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) interface, implementation of 
remote service, and exposing the remote service to local clients.  
 
Safe memory management: 
Each Android application runs in a separate process within its own Dalvik instance. Dalvik is a 
register-based virtual machine optimized to ensure that a device can run multiple instances 
efficiently. Dalvik is responsible for memory and process management during run time and can 
stop and kill processes as necessary. Memory management related vulnerabilities such as buffer 
overflow, memory leak, and uninitialized pointer usage are eliminated by incorporating some of 
the well-known technologies like Address Space Layout Randomization (to prevent code 
injection attack), NX (non-executable stack due to buffer overflow), and ProPolice (return 
address space corruption prevention).  
 
Data encryption: 
 Android allows users to encrypt their data and other profile information. It is possible to encrypt 
accounts, downloaded applications, media files, and settings. An encrypted device can be 
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decrypted based on a user chosen password (during each time the device is powered on). The 
encryption process is costly both in terms of processing power (device needs to be plugged with 
power) and time (can take more than an hour) (Brinkmann, 2012). 
 
2.5 Android Malware 
Malware or "malicious software" is implemented with malicious intention. Malware is often 
installed without the victim’s knowledge of the capability of unintended actions that can be 
performed. More specifically, victims usually overlook the list of permissions needed to run the 
malware and voluntarily grant the permission without understanding the effect of malicious 
actions. Under the broad definition of malware, several categories are well-known including 
virus (a malicious program that can copy itself in an infected computer), worms (similar to virus, 
except having the ability of propagation in new machines), and Trojan horses (a program that 
installs a backdoor in an infected computer to communicate with hacker-controlled computer) 
(“What is Malware?”, 2013). 
 
Table 3: A List of Malicious Actions Performed by Android Malware 
(Felt et al. 2011)  




Novelty and amusement by change the 






Secretly accessing user information 
stored on the Android device. GET_ACCOUNTS 
SMS Message and 
Premium Rate Calls 
(M3) 
Bills victim by arbitrarily initiating 
phone calls to premium numbers or 







Locking a client’s phone by changing 









Secretly accessing and updating user 







Tapjacking is another form of malware. The act of tapjacking occurs when a user unknowingly 
triggers a malicious code by clicking a button or a view. There are several ways to initiate 
tapjacking attacks, and this thesis explores five different types of malicious tapjacking actions. 
Table 3 shows a classification of tapjacking malware that are capable of performing specific 
operations in the Android platform. Tapjacking malware includes the changing of the desktop 
setting by installing wallpaper without user knowledge (M1), accessing device and personal 
profile information and sending it over the Internet to unwanted third parties (M2), launching 
phone calls and sending messages to premium numbers (M3), asking for ransom by locking the 
phone and suggesting to pay for unlocking (M4), and hacking social network accounts (M5). 
Each of these malware types requires one or more permission changes for the malware to take its 
course. 
 
Note that some of the malware applications are known as spyware. Spywares are programs 
developed to monitor and log activities performed on a computer (e.g., Keylogger). Spyware not 
only collects sensitive personal information (e.g., websites visited, typed password), but also 
steals information, and in the worst case can send them to others for further damages 
(“Difference between Adware and Spyware”, 2005). 
 
Adware is another malware application type. Adware displays advertisements and marketing 
contents automatically after the installation. Advertisements are displayed in a small section of 
the interface or as a pop-up window. It is used for legitimate reason such as generating revenues 
for companies who intend to sell products. An example of adware is the popular e-mail program 
named Eudora ("Eudora", 2014). It can be purchased in sponsored mode, when Eudora displays 
an advertisement window containing toolbar links. We do not consider such adware as 
malicious.  
 
2.6 Classification of Android Malware 
In this section, we show code level examples of tapjacking malware that can represent the five 
types of tapjacking malware discussed in Table 3. Tapjacking is the root cause of the five 
mentioned malware types because of its similar deceptive, malicious acts. Figure 2 shows how a 
tapjacking attack could occur when a user clicks a submit button in a mobile application. The 
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submit button could be as simple as sending an SMS or even updating your Facebook profile. 
Each time the user clicks the submit button, the onClick() method is called and the 
openNextUIView() and startMaliciousCode() methods are executed. As the user views the next 
UI view, malicious code is being executed without their knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 2: Tapjacking attack triggered by button click 
 
We discuss the key part of Java code and the list of permissions that appear in 
AndroidManifest.xml file for the reader’s convenience. It is important to note that both sections 
of code, Java code and permissions, are necessary to perform the listed malware actions. All java 
source files and interactive user views (activities) must be listed. This is a requirement for all 
mobile applications. In all malicious actions, a user is first required to agree to the permission list 
when downloading and installing the mobile applications. Therefore, it is very important for a 
user to remain vigilant about requested permissions in mobile applications.  
 
2.7 Changing Wallpaper (M1) 
Earlier, we discussed how malicious code could be used to change the mobile phone’s wallpaper. 
Though this may seem like a fairly trivial act, one must realize that changing the wallpaper is 
accessed through the mobile device settings. If malicious developers can gain access to your 
mobile device settings, then they can do almost anything that they desire on your mobile device. 
In Figure 3, we examine the source code responsible for executing the malicious action of 
changing the wallpaper without the user’s specification. In this case, the required permission is 
SET_WALLPAPER, shown in Figure 4. Without this line of code, the malicious code would be 
ineffective. During development, permissions are automatically added when a developer invokes 
//user clicks a submit button on the screen 
Button submitButton = findViewById(R.id.clickButton);  
 
submitButton.setOnClickListener( new OnClickListener() {         
 @Override        
 public void onClick(View v) { 
  openNextUIView(); //show the next UI screen  





Android classes directly linked to that permission. However, the system is not able to determine 
if the developer is attempting to use the permission in a malicious way. 
 
 
Figure 3: Required source code to change wallpaper 




Figure 4: Required permission for changing wallpaper 
Source: “Set Wallpaper using WallpaperManager”, 2011 
 
 
In Figure 5, we examine a code snippet on how to change the sound settings on the mobile 
device. A malicious application can access the AudioManager and set the ringer volume to zero. 
As a result, a victim will not be altered or notified for related activities such as incoming phone 
call or SMS messages. On the contrary, their phone’s ringtone could sound very loudly during an 
important business meeting. 
 
 
Figure 5: Silence the sound settings on an Android device 
Source: “How to make android phone silent in java”, 2012 
 
 
2.8 Accessing User Credentials (M2) 
As stated above, the mobile device settings are the key to the control of the mobile device. 
However, it is also equally important to secure personal information on the device. Most mobile 
applications have the ability to run continuously in the foreground. These mobile applications 
could be anything from Gmail, Facebook, or Instagram. In order to gain access to the accounts 
//Retrieve instance of the application 
WallpaperManager myWallpaperManager = 
 WallpaperManager.getInstance(getApplicationContext()); 
 
//R.drawable.five presents a stored image 
myWallpaperManager.setResource(R.drawable.five); 
<uses-permission  
 android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER" /> 
//Access system settings for the audio 
AudioManager audio = 
(AudioManager)getSystemService(Context.AUDIO_SERVICE);  
 





linked to your Facebook or Instagram, you only need a username and password. The username 
and password are both treated as a string of characters. If your mobile application is running in 




Figure 6: Required source code to access user account information 
Source: “How to get the Android device’s Primary Email Address”, 2010 
 
 
Figure 6 shows how a malicious mobile application can access and retrieve a user’s email 
address. It’s important to note that this source code applies to devices with an API level of 8 or 
greater. First, the malicious code seeks to retrieve the email address. Then, the code searches the 
device for all accounts, denoted by getAccounts(), associated with that email address. Most 
times, we use the same email address for our social networking accounts, school accounts, and 
personal accounts. Lastly, all of the accounts are iterated over in order to find the user’s login, or 
account.name.  
 
The GET_ACCOUNTS permission, shown in Figure 7, is the only required permission for 
retrieving user accounts. However, if a developer wanted to make changes to the user account 
information, they would be required to list permissions for editing the user account. This means 
that the mobile application would seek to acquire read and write access for user account 
information. However, this case only seeks to retrieve or get the user’s accounts. 
 
 
Figure 7:Required permission for retrieving user account information 
Source: “How to get the Android device’s Primary Email Address”, 2010 
 
Pattern emailPattern = Patterns.EMAIL_ADDRESS;  
 
// Functionality is available for API level 8+  
Account[] accounts = AccountManager.get(context).getAccounts();  
 
for (Account account : accounts) {    
 if (emailPattern.matcher(account.name).matches()) {  




 android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS" /> 
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2.9 SMS Message and Premium Rate Call (M3) 
An SMS is the primary choice of communication for most people today. Unfortunately, SMS 
message sending is also one of the most popular types of malicious activities. SMS messages can 
be easily sent, received, and read while at work, in meetings, etc. In addition, most people carry 
their mobile devices everywhere; this makes SMS a very efficient portal of communication. 
Figure 8 shows the only permission, SEND_SMS, required to send an SMS message. However, 




Figure 8: Required permission to send SMS message 
Source: “Send SMS in Android”, 2013 
 
 
The first option is shown in Figure 9. It outlines a hidden attempt to send an SMS message. Here, 
SmsManager.getDefault() returns the default SMS engine. The sendTextMessage() method is 
called to send a message. This way of sending a message can easily be included in any method or 
loop without the user’s knowledge. Since the action is hidden and does not require user input, it 
can be flagged as suspicious or malicious activity. However, this method could also be used to 
send the SMS message after retrieving the user input from the UI elements. Therefore, scanning 
for this method signature could also lead to a false positive warning. The key indicator to 
determining if it’s being using maliciously is to look for hard-coded values that are not passed 
back from the user’s input into the UI. 
 
 
Figure 9: Hidden method to send SMS message 
Source: “Send SMS in Android”, 2013 
 
 
Note that among the five parameters, the first is used to supply a phone number (variable or hard 
coded), the second is the service center address but is not required because the default will be 
<uses-permission 
 android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"/> 
//Retrieve the default SMS engine 
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault();     
 
//Send a text message using desired text 
sms.sendTextMessage(phoneNumber, null, message, null, null); 
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used, the third is for the message contents, the fourth broadcasts when the message is sent (if this 
parameter is not null), and the fifth broadcasts when the message is delivered (if this parameter is 
not null). 
 
Figure 10 shows the second option of sending an SMS message using Intent object creation 
followed by launching an activity running on the background (startActivity() method call). Note 
that during the Intent object creation, a Uri.parse() method is invoked to indicate the sending of 
SMS message to a phone number. Such SMS sending operation also does not require any 
interaction with a user, hence, can be considered as potentially malicious. Note that the 
destination phone number and the desired message are retrieved directly from the UI elements 
and sent to the next view, or activity. 
 
 
Figure 10: Visible method to send SMS message 
Source: “Send SMS in Android”, 2013 
 
 
In Figure 11, we show how a mobile application can initiate a phone call. In this case, a phone 
call is initiated using the Intent object creation (specifying appropriate flag of 
Intent.ACTION_CALL). Note that the dialer is never used here, as a result a user will not notice 
that a phone call is initiated. Moreover, the supplied phone number (number) can be a fixed hard-
coded premium number is called without the user’s knowledge. This can lead to expensive phone 
bill, especially if the mobile application is left running overnight while the user is away from the 
device. In order to perform this action, a malicious developer would include the permissions 
listed in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 11: Initiating a phone call without using phone dialer 
Source: "How to make a phone call in Android", 2011 
 
//Send a text message using text from user’s screen 
startActivity(new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, Uri.parse("sms:"   
+ phoneNumber))); 
//Initiate a phone call using desired phone number 
String number = “1-900-444-8821”; 
 








Figure 12: Required permissions to make phone call without phone dialer 
Source: "How to make a phone call in Android", 2011 
 
 
2.10 Phone Ransom (M4) 
Phone ransom is a fairly new occurrence in mobile malware. By gaining access to the user’s 
settings, a malicious developer can change the mobile device password and lock the mobile user 
out of their own device. Normally, a message is then displayed on the wallpaper or lock screen, 
which prompts the user to either pay to unlock the phone or to simply taunt the user for being 
breached.  
Figure 13 shows how to lock the screen of a mobile device. The KeyguardManager is accessed 
which further accesses the KeyguardLock for enabling or disabling the default lock. One 
objective of malware is to disable the lock for the purpose of ransom. A message is later 
displayed prompting the user to pay a fee in order to unlock the device and continue unharmed. 
However, this is often just a ploy in order to retrieve funds from a very desperate person. Figure 
14 shows the required permissions to edit phone settings and save them accordingly. 
 
Figure 13: Lock an Android device and disable keyguard 










//Access system settings for the keyguard 
KeyguardManager mgr = 
 (KeyguardManager)getSystemService(Activity.KEYGUARD_SERVICE);  
  
// Lock the device 
KeyguardLock lock = mgr.newKeyguardLock(KEYGUARD_SERVICE);  
 





Figure 14: Required permissions to disable keyguard 
Source: “Lock and Android phone”, 2012 
 
 
By listing WRITE_SETTINGS and WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, we are able to cover more 
circumstances. The first simply allows a malicious developer to make changes to all of the 
device settings. The second is used for mobile applications signed by the operating system. 
Together, this is a very strong combination for having complete access to alter a mobile device 
according to the malicious developer’s desires. 
 
2.11 Hacking Social Networks (M5) 
Malicious activities have escalated even higher with Android’s added ability to synch mobile 
application with social networks in API Level 15. Now, a user can update his/her status on 
Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks directly from the mobile device. With this added 
implementation, many security threats have emerged and malicious attacks can be mounted. In 
Figure 15, we examine how a malicious mobile application can easily gain access to a user 
account and send fraudulent status updates to the user profile.  
 
 
Figure 15: Code snippet for updating social network account 
Source: “Get Social Updates of your contact list using Ice cream sandwich”, 2012 
<uses-permission  
 android:name="android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD "/> 
 
<uses-permission   





//Create status update to post on user profile 
ContentValues values = new ContentValues();  
values.put(StreamItems.RAW_CONTACT_ID, rawContactId);  //destination 
values.put(StreamItems.TEXT, "Lunch at 3.00 PM");    //message 
values.put(StreamItems.TIMESTAMP, timestamp);    //timestamp 
values.put(StreamItems.COMMENTS, "Family and Friends");  //comments 
  
//Specify where content will be posted and send request to post content 
Uri.Builder builder = StreamItems.CONTENT_URI.buildUpon(); 
builder.appendQueryParameter(RawContacts.ACCOUNT_NAME, accountName); 
builder.appendQueryParameter(RawContacts.ACCOUNT_TYPE, accountType); 
Uri streamItemUri = getContentResolver().insert(builder.build(), values);  
long streamItemId = ContentUris.parseId(streamItemUri); 
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In the first section of Figure 15, the code fills in required format and the desired contents to be 
posted on the account. Then, the code acquires access to that user account. After gaining access 
to the user profile, a malicious activity can then gather the user’s interests, friend’s list, and a 
multitude of other details. Since individuals tend to post birthday pictures, pet names, and other 
private information, they are vulnerable to identity theft. As shown in the last section of the 
figure, the request is sent in a readable format to the destination address, and the user’s account 
is updated with the fraudulent information. Figure 16 outlines the required permissions for 
accessing and updating a user profile on a social network.   
 
 
Figure 16: Required permissions to update social network profile 
































This section presents a literature review of recent work on Android malware and the various 
techniques for mitigation of Android malware applications. Many detection techniques have 
been proposed in the literature to enhance the security of Android platforms and deployed 
applications. We chose three detection techniques that closely relate to our proposed KLD-based 
detection technique. These techniques include sandboxing systems for Android applications 
(Blasing et al. 2010), machine learning to extract static features of Android applications (Shabtai 
et al. 2010), decompiler-based static analysis (Enck et al. 2011), and permission-based detection 
techniques (Barrera et al. 2011). These techniques were compiled during a literature study of 
malware in mobile applications; we briefly explain the advantages and disadvantages of these 
related works.  
 
3.2 Sandboxing Detection 
A sandbox (Blasing et al. 2010) provides a realistic execution environment, but in an isolated 
manner. As a result, the effect of a potential malicious application does not affect the outside 
environment. It is useful not only for signature identification, but also for disinfecting a malware. 
The sandbox has two steps: static and dynamic analysis.  
 
An Android application is shipped as a compressed (apk extension) installation file. In static 
analysis, the sandbox decompresses installation files and disassembles executable files to 
identify malicious code fragments. When decompressed, the content is saved into three main 
parts: AndroidManifest.xml (an XML file having the meta-information of the application 
including its description and security permissions), classes.dex (a file having the Java bytecode 
that can be interpreted by Dalvik Virtual Machine), and res (a special folder having files that 




The manifest file contains the main “launchable activity” information. The byte code (from 
classes.dex) of the application is converted to human readable format having a folder hierarchy 
containing files with parsable pseudo-code. The code is then scanned for suspicious patterns. A 
list of static code patterns that are commonly considered as Android malware (Blasing et al. 
2010) are as follows: the usage of the Java Native Interface, the usage of getRuntime, the usage 
of Java reflection, the usage of services and IPC provision, and the usage of android permissions. 
 
The dynamic analysis phase of the sandbox system is intended to monitor system and library 
calls with arguments. In general, system calls are function invocations made from user space into 
the kernel to request services or resources from the operating system (Hyatt, 2013). A Loadable 
Kernel Module (LKM) is implemented and placed in the Android emulator environment. The 
modified kernel keeps logging the function calls invoked by applications and their arguments for 
later analysis. This gives a low-level system call sequence responsible for malicious activities. 
 
Advantages: The sandbox reduces the generation of signatures based on system level call 
tracing. It has been shown that on average it takes 48 days to come up with the signatures of a 
new malware, which leaves the window of damaging opportunity by malware wide (Oberheide, 
Cooke, & Jahanian, 2008). 
 
Disadvantages: As the lowest level of system calls are intercepted and logged, implementation 
of a loadable kernel module (LKM) is daunting and error prone task. Special attention is needed 
as emulator tends are very unstable if low-level changes are performed. 
 
3.3 Machine Learning Detection 
Machine Learning algorithms originated as heuristic-based detection methods that could easily 
evaluate software in search of malware. Since machine learning is automated, malicious features 
are predetermined and normally classified by their distinct code patterns. In addition, machine 
learning can process static code and determine its malicious capability. Static analysis uses 
significantly less time and resources. More importantly, it does not require the mobile 
application to be executed as in dynamic analysis. Shabtai et al. (2010) apply the machine 
learning technique to differentiate the characteristic of applications between two categories: tools 
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and games. They extracted features from the byte-code (dex files) and XML (permission). The 
learned features were used to identify the general type of the application, which can be used as 
an indicator for potential malicious activities.  
 
The machine learning process has two phases: training and testing. First, a classification model is 
derived from a group of predetermined vectors and labels that represent the learning algorithm. 
This model is referred to as the training set. For accuracy and inclusion, the training set should 
include a wide variety of malicious applications. However, it’s equally important that learning 
algorithm is able to properly identify the varying code patterns the malicious mobile 
applications. Then, a testing set of APKs is parsed according to its identifier, or its obvious 
malicious features. Each of the malicious actions exists within a representative vector and can be 
used to predict the origin of the malicious activity. If a malicious feature is flagged in the testing 
phase, the learning algorithm is able to determine which class files are affected.  
 
There are three main problems with the extraction of malicious features: misleading the learning 
algorithm with inaccurate features, over-fitting or crowding with the amount of features to be 
evaluated, and creating a model complexity which exceeds the power of the learning algorithm 
(Shabtai et al. 2010). For accuracy and efficiency, filters are used to prevent the occurrence of 
the three difficulties above. These filters are responsible for ranking and scoring the features and 
determining which features are selected for the classification model.  
 
Advantages: The approach is automated and can enable the static detection of malware 
applications. This proves to be extremely beneficial in cases where executing a possibly 
malicious application would cause harm to the evaluator's machine. 
 
Disadvantages: Depending on the type of classification algorithms, performance will vary. Also, 
the accuracy of training is important. A good initial dataset representing all types of applications 
are needed. If an application fits into overlapping category (e.g., a game application need to send 
information over the internet to store score of a user online which may be of similar to an 
application intended for browsing on the web), then machine learning is prone to false positive 
warning for benign application. 
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3.4 Static Analysis Detection 
Enck et al. (2011) analyzed a large set of android applications collected from market to identify a 
set of dataflow, structure, and semantic patterns. It is also very important to evaluate the 
development background and run-time environment compilation of an Android application, such 
as the application structure, register architecture, and the instruction set. The dataflow patterns 
identify whether any sensitive data information piece should not be sent to outside (e.g., IMEI, 
IMSI, ICC-ID). The structural analysis logs any API usage for retrieving sensitive information 
such as device ID or telephone manager. The semantic analysis performs the arguments of 
parameter method calls. For example, when a text message is being sent, it is checked if it is 
being used either to a constant or a dynamic number. The earlier might represent a malicious 
application activity. Their observation from seemingly benign applications can be considered as 
features to develop signatures.  
 
Their ded decompiler (Enck et al. 2011) can recover the original application source code. The 
source code is then scanned and analyzed to uncover possible security threats. Though Enck et 
al. did not focus malware analysis in their study, the decompiler uncovered misuse of phone 
metadata. The analysis of the application source code revealed 27 findings of data misuse and 
improper coding practices. Some of those findings include “Phone identifiers are frequently 
leaked through plaintext requests”, “Phone identifiers are sent to advertisement and analytics 
servers”, “Some developer toolkits probe for permissions”, and “Few applications unsafely 
delegate actions”. 
 
Batyuk et al. (2011) proposed not only the detection of malicious application’s signature but also 
proposed a flexible mitigation approach. They performed static analysis on binary code of 
android applications (after decompressing APK and decoding Java bytecode into Smali assembly 
language). They looked for the presence of APIs that may be relevant to reading sensitive 
information (e.g., IMEI or device identifier, IMSI or subscriber identifier, phone number, ICC-
ID or SIM card serial number, writing information to output stream) as well as any functionality 
for third party usage related to “Ads” and “Analytics”. The mitigation approach can 
accommodate users’ needs, which could be to either deny the installation of application based on 
the generated report or apply patching to mitigate potential security risks.  
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Yang et al. (2012) detected money-stealing malware. They examine the manifest file of android 
applications to see if a billing permission is present. Then they looked for specific method calls 
or APIs that perform SMS messaging or calls to premium phone numbers. Finally, they check 
for the presence of notification suppressor (i.e., extending SmsReceiver or BroadcastReciever 
classes and overriding onReceive or abortBroadCast methods, respectively to suppress message 
sent notification supplied from the corresponding ISPs) that prevents victims from knowing that 
messages are being sent or calls have been made without their consent. 
 
Seo et al. (2012) developed a framework to automatically decompile the package of android 
applications from both official websites (e.g., Google’s Android Market, Apple’s AppStore) and 
third party (or black marketers). Then analyzed the decompressed source files to obtain the API 
calls present in methods and applied known information about risky API calls to classify 
applications as malware or benign. In particular, they label method calls obtaining sensitive 
information. For example, getSimSerialNumber() for getting SIM card serial number, 
sendDataMessage() for sending data, reading local file with File(), changing background image 
with WallpaperManager.setResource(), downloading files from Internet with openStream(), and 
getting latitude and longitude with getLatitude(), getLongitude()) calls. They checked the 
execution of the APIs using a virtual machine.  
 
Schmidt et al. (2008) developed an anomaly detection approach for mobile devices. In particular, 
they collected feature data from mobile devices running the Symbian operating system. 
Examples of features range from simple (user inactivity, free RAM), medium (process count), 
and complex (CPU usage, and outbox SMS message count). By relying on native APIs supported 
by the OS, simple features can be collected. While relying on multiple APIs and heuristics, 
specific algorithms can also collected the medium and complex features. The features can detect 
anomaly activities due to malware. For example, if a malware sends SMS message due to a 
keystroke, then the number of processes increases (for sending each of the message), the amount 
of free RAM decreases, and the number of message count in the outbox increases. 
 
Advantages: There are a wide variety of possible threats identified by this method and could be 
used to set a new standard of proper coding practices. Though the findings were not malware, 
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they illustrate how easily a mobile application can be infiltrated due to poor coding practices or 
suspicious activity.  
 
Disadvantages: It is very difficult to uncover malicious applications using this method because 
many poorly written mobile applications would be flagged as malicious causing false positive 
warnings. Therefore, it is important to note that this detection technique is more useful for 
determining potential risks and allow developers to close possible loopholes beforehand. 
 
3.5 Permission Analysis Detection 
Barrera et al. (2010) applied a self-organizing map-based learning algorithm to cluster different 
permission sets. Although the study relies on a set of general Android applications, it cannot be 
applied for detecting malware due to the observation that both malicious and benign applications 
may have similar types of permissions. Similarly, Porter et al. (2011) compared the permission 
system between Google Chrome and Google Android, and performed a subjective analysis for 
improving permission model in general for security and user level awareness. Nevertheless, a 
detection technique is still needed to identify malicious behaviors of malware, and our approach 
is complementary to these earlier efforts. 
 
Schimidt et al. (2009) detected malware running on iOS platform. They analyzed executable 
code and performed machine learning (leveraging clustering algorithms) to identify features 
common in malicious applications. In particular, the features target the low level network and 
file system operations such as file copying and getting the host address.  
 
Enck et al. (2009) developed a rule-based certification technique named Kirin that can check the 
presence of undesirable properties in applications suspected as malware. The approach starts 
from general functionality requirements and then analyzed whether required permissions can 
create conflicting operations that are used in malware operations. For example, an application 
should not have both RECEIVE_SMS and WRITE_SMS permission. The success of the 




Advantages: Because permissions are displayed to the user at install time, mobile users can 
determine whether an application’s permissions relate to the purpose of the mobile application. 
Unknown or unused permissions are a great indicator of potential malicious activity. The 
permission-based detection technique is also intelligent enough to discern whether a mobile 
application’s settings and properties align with its stated intention.  
 
Disadvantages: Permissions can be maliciously inserted into an AndroidManifest.xml file after 
the user has installed the mobile application to the device Chin et al. (2011). Therefore, it is not 
ideal to rely on permission-based analysis as the sole detection technique.  
 
3.6 Other Work 
Nicolaou et al. (2013) explore the exponential rise of web browsing since 1999. With the rise of 
mobile devices, web browsing on mobile application devices will soon dominate web traffic. The 
authors also explore how companies and mobile developers will need to begin making the 
transition to mobile websites or mobile applications. More importantly, with the transition of 
web applications onto your mobile device, mobile users are susceptible to the many issues of 
web traffic and HTTP connections. In addition, network connectivity is not as stable in mobile 
applications as it is in desktop and laptop browsers. Therefore, users could experience many 
dropped requests. Furthermore, users would be required to keep an updated mobile device so that 
their machines can still efficiently process data from the applications.  
 
Rastogi et al. (2013) developed a systematic framework named DroidChameleon for evaluation 
purposes. In the ten popular commercial anti-malware applications used, none of the applications 
was able to thwart attacks from modified malware. It appears that malware authors frequently 
use that polymorphism as an obfuscation technique to avoid detection by transforming the 
malware into different forms. Metamorphism is also used because it mutates the code so that it is 
removed but still executes the same behavior.  
 
The author's findings were as follows: 
• All the studied anti-malware products are vulnerable to common transformations. 
• At least 43% signatures are not based on code- level artifacts. 
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• 0% of signatures do not require static analysis of bytecode. Only one of ten anti-malware 
tools was found to be using static analysis. 
• Anti-malware tools have evolved towards content-based signatures over the past year (or 
since 2012). 
 
Chin et al. (2011) analyzed 20 mobile applications; 60% of them contained exploitable security 
vulnerabilities. The authors used the ComDroid tool for analyzing the apps. Message passing 
vulnerabilities are dangerous because they leave the user susceptible to stolen passwords, emails, 
banking information, etc. Android’s message passing system can be very vulnerable for non-
savvy developers and unsuspecting end-users. Their findings are shown below: 
• Broadcast theft – silently reading (or eavesdropping) the contents of a broadcast intent 
without actually interrupting or stealing the broadcast  
• Activity hijacking – malicious activities are launched instead of the actual activity 
Service hijacking – malicious services intercept an intent that was meant to be sent to a 
legitimate service.  
• Special intents – Intent uses a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) reference and is able to 
add permissions for that intent without the end-users’ knowledge. 
• Malicious broadcast injection – malicious intents can propagate throughout the 
application by using commands in a broadcast intent 
• Malicious activity launch – launching malicious activities implicitly or explicitly 
through the use of the Intent 
• Malicious service launch – any application can start and bind to unprotected services 
 
Chin et al. (2011) also explore “Intents”, which can be used for intra-application and inter-
application communication. There are four main components for the Intents: activities, services, 
broadcast receivers, and content providers. Intents can use message passing for three of the 
components: activities, services, and broadcast receivers. From a permissions level, services and 
activities must be declared in the AndroidManifest.xml in order to receive other intents. The 
message passing system uses the same “Intents” for transmitting data outside of the application 
to third party by the use of links or APIs or by passing information between views of a mobile 
application. The main red flag is the use of an explicit Intent that calls a developer specified 
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recipient. Using the default Android platform, one would simply allow the Android application 






Proposed KLD-Based Malware Detection 
 
4.1 Overview 
Instead of using heuristic-based approaches, such as Euclidean Distance or other measures, to 
compare an application with known sample applications, this work uses a formal method based 
on probabilistic models. It is assumed that all benign applications are generated by a hidden 
probabilistic model (say M_benign); and each malicious application is generated from a hidden 
probabilistic model (say M_malicious). The hypothesis is that the divergence between the 
models M_benign and M_malicious should be detectable. Then, Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
(KLD) is used to evaluate the divergence between the M_benign and M_malicious models. 
 
Since the hidden probabilistic models are unknown, observable features generated from either 
model are used to approximate the model.  For this purpose, features (f1 to f10) are extracted.  It is 
further assumed that each application is generated by randomly sampling (f1 to f10) from the 
hidden model. Since the observed population is very limited, a smoothing technique is needed to 
avoid zero probability of feature observation. 
 
The KLD computes the divergence between two given probability distributions. Let us assume 
that P and Q represent two probability distributions, 
 
where P = {p1, ..., pn} and Q = {q1, ..., qn}. 
 
 Then, the KLD is defined as follows (Cover & Thomas, 2006):  
 







Here, the following two constraints are satisfied: 
 
   = 1  ………………………………. Equation ii 
   = 1  ………………………………. Equation iii 
 
Cooper (2014a) starts with a hypothesis that the KLD between benign and malicious application 
for performing a specific operation should be relatively high. On the other hand, the KLD among 
benign applications performing the same operation should be relatively low. This approach uses 
different features to detect malicious applications. We define feature elements from the source 
code that relate to the primary purpose of the application’s functionality. Using this information, 
we are able to determine suspicious malware applications. Our prototype implementation 
analyzes the source code of a suspected malware application in a secure environment without 
running the malware application on a mobile device. 
 
4.2 Related Work 
Our work is motivated by a number of works that apply the concept of Kullback-Leibler 
Divergence (KLD) as a measure to solve a number of problems from various domains including 
document’s author identification (Bigi, 2003), masquerade attack detection for network security 
(Tapiador & Clark, 2010), outlier data value detection in wireless sensor network (Li & Wang, 
2012), quality of non-object oriented software modularization (Sarkar, Rama, & Kak, 2007), and 
risk analysis in the domain of fuel cell study (Fukui, Sato, Mizusaki, & Numao, 2010). 
 
Bigi (2003) applied KLD to identify authorship of documents. The approach first builds a model 
of each document author by aggregating documents generated by that author. It first develops a 
set of candidate models. Then, for a given document of unknown author, the approach finds the 
smallest KLD between a known model and the document. The model that is closest to the 
document is selected as the author. Similar to this work, we apply constant back-off smoothing 
technique to address the missing elements (or tokens derived from Java code of the malware). 
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Specifically, we compare the KLD between the code level features captured by population 
elements of an application and the expected population obtained from benign applications. The 
deviation, if exceeds a given threshold value, provides an indication of the presence of malware 
operation in an application. 
 
Tapiador et al. (2010) detected masquerade attacks based on an anomaly-based technique that 
compares a given request with known normal request using KLD measure. In a masquerade 
attack, an attacker steals credentials of legitimate users and performs further malicious actions 
using the credentials. The KLD enables the detection of padding in command sequences 
independent of the length and position in a block of request. In contrast, we apply KLD to detect 
malware activities based on code level features.  
 
Li et al. (2012) applied differential KLD to detect anomalous data value in wireless sensor 
networks. The network is divided into clusters. In each cluster, the sensors remain physically 
close to each other and sense similar values. The outlier values are detected using KLD. Sarkar et 
al. (2007) applied information theoretic measure including KLD to measure the quality of 
modularization in non-object oriented software systems. Fukui et al. (2010) measured the 
similarity of events based on KLD and applied it in the domain of fuel-cell study. 
 
4.3 KLD-Based Approach 
 KLD is not a distance; it is a divergence between two probability distributions that are 
asymmetric in nature. All of the literature work that we studied employs KLD to detect anomaly 
or security issues; none has compared the KLD value with any distance metrics, such as 
Euclidean or cosine. We consider SMS message sending as a case study for this work. For a 
given SMS functionality, we identify the source code responsible for invoking it along with 
source of inputs. The malicious applications typically do not accept inputs from users and mostly 
supplies static values during the invocation of method calls. On the other hand, the legitimate 
applications, while performing the same functionality, rely on user-supplied inputs. This makes a 
difference between the behavior of a malicious and a legitimate application. KLD can be a 





To compute the KLD between two population sets (or probability distributions), we need to 
define a set of elements relevant to the specific SMS operations and obtain a collection of 
legitimate application samples to build P set. Now, given that we have a new application (Q), we 
can then find how divergent is the new application compared to the P set with respect to SMS 
operation to label the new application as malware or good application. 
 
However, the challenge here is computing the term pi * log2 (pi/qi). It can be rewritten as 
subtraction of two terms: pi * log2 (pi) – pi * log2 (qi). While we compute KLD (P, Q), if either pi 
or qi is zero (no occurrence of probability is observed from applications), then the term becomes 
infinite, which results in KLD (P, Q) to be zero. To address this issue, we propose to apply a 
well-known smoothing technique known as constant back-off (Bigi et al. 2003). Here, all zero 
probability values in both P and Q are substituted with a very negligible constant value and all 
the non-zero values are equally subtracted with the same constant amount proportionally so that 
Equations (ii) and (iii) are still satisfied. This simple step results in two smoothed probability 
distributions denoted as P' (derived from P) and Q' (derived from Q). So, we essentially compute 
KLD (P', Q') to avoid infinity problem instead of KLD (P, Q). 
 
4.4 Elements of Population 
Table 4 shows the list of 10 elements (f1-f10) that we consider in building the population of 
elements and compute their occurrence probabilities from Android applications. Among them, 
the first five elements are commonly found to be legitimate ways of sending (f1-f4) or receiving 
(f5) SMS messages (based on extensive survey and reports from related work).  
 
For example, f1 represents sending SMS message by creating a visual Action window where a 
user can provide message and destination number for sending a message. At the Java source code 
level, we then look for the following sequence of method call invocation: setContentView() that 
allows for displaying of an Action window on the screen, one or more call of getText() to access 
the current values of input from GUIs passed as SMS sending operation argument, and the 
presence of the event handler that invokes the text retrieval operation and SMS sending 
operation. Good applications send SMS messages using variables as part of their argument of the 
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respective method (sendTextMessage() and variable argument) as shown in f2. An application 
may rely on creating an Intent object and store SMS messages as part of the method call 
argument (putExtra) followed by launching the Activity (f3). The Uri.parse() method can be 
invoked as well for sending messages (f4). 
 
Table 4: A Description of SMS Operational Element for Building Population Set 
 




SMS message is sent with 





SmsManager object is created, 
sendTxtMsg is invoked, 
variable argument is present 
SmsManager class, 
sendTextMessage(), variable argument 
f3 
Create Intent object, write SMS 
message, variable argument 
message, start Activity 
Intent class, putExtra(), variable SMS 
message or phone number, 
startActivity() 
f4 
Start activity with “smsto:” 
string in Uri.parse method and 
variable parameter for SMS 
message 
startActivity(),Uri.parse(), presence of 
“smsto:”, variable argument in 
Uri.parse() 
f5 
Message delivery or receiving 
status is notified 
Presence of Toast.makeToast() with 
SMS keyword or presence of 
exception handling for message 




SMS message is sent without 
input from visual interfaces, 
and in presence or absence of 
event handler method 
SmsManager, no getText(), no event 
handler for the SMS sending operation 
f7 
SmsManager object is created, 
sendTxtMsg is invoked, 
constant argument present 
SmsManager, sendTextMessage(), 
constant SMS message or phone 
number 
f8 
Using intent object, putting 
SMS body, and constant 
argument message 
Intent class, putExtra(), constant 
argument for SMS message or phone 
number 
f9 
Start activity with “smsto:” 
string in Uri.parse method and 
constant parameter 
representing SMS message 
startActivity(),Uri.parse(), presence of 
"smsto:" string, constant argument for 
message or phone number in 
Uri.parse() 
f10 
Message delivery or receiving 
status is not notified 
No presence of Toast.makeToast(), 
and no exception handling for 





Finally, a legitimate application notifies users about the receiving of any incoming message that 
could be due to the failure of sending an earlier message from a phone, or receiving a message 
from new source. In this case, we check the presence of viewable Activity window and explicit 
code for handling the status (f5). More specifically, we look for the presence of the 
Toast.makeToast()method invocation with short message containing the keyword “SMS” and 
exception handling code that does not suppress the SMS sending error message or receiving 
information. Similarly, the last five elements (f6 - f10) represent malicious ways of sending (f6 - f9) 
or receiving (f10) SMS messages. For example, one way of sending SMS would be not to display 
any Activity window (no setContentView() call), no extraction of inputs (no getText() call), and 
no event handler method invocation where SMS sending is taking place. Similarly, we look for 
the sequence of the absence of other API sequence to identify these elements. 
 
4.5 Back-off Smoothing 
For a given set of legitimate Android applications, we compute the P set containing the 
occurrence of f1 - f10 and the probability distribution. Then, given a new Android application we 
identify the Q set containing the occurrence probability of f1 - f10 and see how distant the two sets 
are to understand the closeness. The less divergence we find, the closer the two sets, hence Q is 
identified to be good application with respect to the specific SMS operation. On the other hand, 
if the divergence is very high, then we label Q as malware. As one or more elements from P and 
Q may not have any occurrence (zero probability), they need to be smoothed (already discussed 
in Section 4.3). 
 
4.6 Evaluation using Data Set 
We evaluated our approach as follows: first we gather a set of legitimate Android applications 
downloaded randomly from the web, where each of the applications contains Java code for 
performing SMS functionalities. To ensure diversity in the test applications, selected applications 
rely on different known techniques of sending or receiving SMS messages (SmsManager, 
putExtra for Intent, Uri.parse). We have total 17 applications in our data set to construct the P 
set. The P set applications are shown in table 5 along with the occurrence (frequency) of their 
44 
 
population elements. The last row of Table 5 shows the combined frequency of all population 
elements (the P set).  
 
For the Q set, we use one application that we are comparing with the P set. Table 6 shows the 
KLD between P and each of the malware (Q). We show the results in terms of P' and Q' (after 
smoothing the sets). The value ranges between 12.47 and 17.25, which provides a basis of 
threshold values for consideration to detect new malware samples for their benign or 
maliciousness. 
 
Table 5: Occurrence of Elements in the P Set 
 
Application f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 
SMS_Android-Build-In-SMS-
Application-Example 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
SMS_Android-Send-SMS-
Example 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample_1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample_2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_apriorit_SecureMessages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_Cloud SMS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_Free SMS India 0 1 0 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 
SMS_GO SMS Pro 0 2 0 0 9 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_Handcent SMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_javacodegeeks_AndroidSM
SExample_1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_MightyText.src 0 4 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 
SMS_mkyong-Android-Send-
SMS-Example 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_mkyoung-Android-Build-
In-SMS-Application-Example 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
SMS_msatpathy_SMSTest 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 
SMS_Ninja SMS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
SMS_SecureMessages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_SMSTest 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 










Table 6: KLD Between Good (P') and Malware (Q') Applications 
 













To further complement our evaluation, we randomly computed the KLD between the trained 
samples (P) and another new set of good applications performing SMS operations. Table 7 
shows a snapshot of the obtained KLD values showing the divergence between good and good 
applications ranges between 5.12 and 17.25.  Our experiment led to one false-positive warning. 
Considering the threshold values obtained from malware analysis in Table 2 (12.47-17.25), we 
find that Virtual Table Tennis 3D application is labeled as malware. The other nine applications 
are considered as benign. Thus, KLD can be a suitable measure to identify malware and benign 
applications for SMS operations if the threshold of divergence is considered carefully. 
 
Table 7: KLD Between Good (P') and Good (Q') Applications 
 
Good Application Name (Q') KLD (P', Q') 
Barcode Scanner 10.81 
FxCamera 9.97 
Huffington Post 11.82 
My Currency – Converter 8.77 
Skype 7.23 
To-Do Calendar Planner 5.12 
Viber 9.42 






Here, we will demonstrate how another metric-based approach will give less accurate results 
when compared to applying our KLD-based approach.  
 
The metric-based approach is defined as follows: 
 
Malicious:  Sum(f6-f10) > Sum(f1-f5)   ……… Equation iv 
Benign:      Sum(f1-f5) ≥  Sum(f6-f10)   ……… Equation v 
 
Table 8 compares the sum of the benign, Sum(f1-f5), elements with the sum of the malicious, 
Sum(f6-f10), elements. We see that this metric-based approach does show that the total sum for all 
benign elements is greater than all of the malicious elements.  
 
Table 8: Sum of Elements in the P Set 
 
Application Sum(f1-f5) Sum(f6-f10) 
SMS_Android-Build-In-SMS-Application-Example 0 1 
SMS_Android-Send-SMS-Example 3 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample_1 3 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample_2 1 0 
SMS_apriorit_SecureMessages 0 0 
SMS_Cloud SMS 1 0 
SMS_Free SMS India 8 2 
SMS_GO SMS Pro 11 2 
SMS_Handcent SMS 0 0 
SMS_javacodegeeks_AndroidSMSExample_1 3 0 
SMS_MightyText.src 8 1 
SMS_mkyong-Android-Send-SMS-Example 3 0 
SMS_mkyoung-Android-Build-In-SMS-Application-Example 0 1 
SMS_msatpathy_SMSTest 6 1 
SMS_Ninja SMS 0 1 
SMS_SecureMessages 0 0 
SMS_SMSTest 6 1 






When we compare the sums for each of the applications in the P set, we also see that most of the 
applications have a higher Sum(f1-f5) value that indicates the application is harmless. However, 
we also see in Table 9 that Sum(f1-f5) is not always greater than Sum(f6-f10). Three of the 
applications had a Sum(f1-f5) value that was less than the Sum(f6-f10). Our KLD-Based approach 
shows that all of the applications in the P set were within the benign threshold of values. 
Therefore, our approach gives more accurate results. 
 
Table 9: Accuracy of Metric-Based Approach for the P Set 
 
P set Correct 14/17 Incorrect 3/17 
 
Next, we tested the metric-based approach on the suspected malicious applications in the Q set.  
In Table 10, we see the occurrence of elements in our first Q set that represent the suspected 
malicious applications. Table 11 compares the sum of the benign, Sum(f1-f5),  elements with the 
sum of the malicious, Sum(f6-f10), elements. In Table 12, we see that the accuracy of the metric-
based approach continues to decrease even though it still holds true to our hypothesis. As shown 
in Table 6, our KLD-Based approach shows that all of the applications in the malicious Q set fall 
within the threshold of values. 
 
 Table 10: Occurrence of Elements in the Malicious Q Set 
 
Application f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 
AndroidDogwar 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
DroidDeluxe 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DroidDreamlight2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DroidKungFu2A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DroidSlasher_1_1.0.1(GoldDreamA) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
HippoSMS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Lovetrap 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Spitmo 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Zitmo 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 








Table 11: Sum of Elements in the Malicious Q Set 
 
Application Sum(f1-f5) Sum(f6-f10) 
AndroidDogwar 0 2 
DroidDeluxe 0 1 
DroidDreamlight2 0 1 
DroidKungFu2A 0 0 
DroidSlasher_1_1.0.1(GoldDreamA) 1 1 
HippoSMS 0 1 
Lovetrap 1 1 
Spitmo 0 2 
Zitmo 0 1 
zj_NinjaChicken_other 1 1 
 
 







Lastly, we tested the metric-based approach on the suspected benign applications in the other Q 
set.  In Table 13, we see the occurrence of elements in our second Q set that represent the 
suspected benign applications. Table 14 compares the sum of the benign, Sum(f1-f5),  elements 
with the sum of the malicious, Sum(f6-f10), elements. In Table 15, we see that the accuracy of the 
metric-based approach is poor in comparison to our KLD-Based approach.  We received only 
one false-positive warning for the Virtual Table Tennis 3D application.  
 
Table 13: Occurrence of Elements in the Benign Q Set 
 
Application f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 
Barcode Scanner 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
FxCamera 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Huffington Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
My Currency – Converter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skype 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
To-Do Calendar Planner 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Viber 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virtual Table Tennis 3D 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
WhatsApp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Table 14: Sum of Elements in the Benign Q Set 
 
Application Sum(f1-f5) Sum(f6-f10) 
Barcode Scanner 0 1 
FxCamera 0 0 
Huffington Post 0 0 
My Currency – Converter 0 0 
Skype 0 0 
To-Do Calendar Planner 1 0 
Viber 1 0 
Virtual Table Tennis 3D 0 1 
WhatsApp 0 0 
YouTube 0 1 
 
 
Table 15: Accuracy of Metric-Based Approach for the Benign Q Set 
 
Benign 












We implemented a prototype application to demonstrate the functionality of our proposed KLD-
Based approach. There are three stages: 
 
(i) decompiling the APK file into readable source code,  
(ii) analyzing the source code using our prototype Java class, and 
(iii) determining the status of a mobile application as good or bad by reviewing the data set.  
 
Our approach is partially automated, and the P set is calculated beforehand from a set of known 
good samples. In this section, we apply Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) to differentiate 
malware and legitimate application behavior for SMS message functionality. We also explain the 
decompiling process in detail using screenshots from our GUI. Note that this application 
implementation is in progress. This chapter presents the work completed as of March 17, 2014.  
 
5.2 Decompiling the APK 
As mentioned above, we first convert the APK file into readable source code. The prototype 
application can automate the decompiling process of the APK file before computing the 
occurrence probability, which is the second stage of our KLD-based approach. Figure 17 
displays the GUI of the decompiling of the APK file. Here, we have three steps: (a) to choose the 
APK file, (b) to convert the APK file to a jar file, and (c) to extract the source code from the jar 
file. The white space will serve as a logger to update the user on their selections and the 
decompiling process. Using the file browser, Figure 18 shows how to browse to the desired 









Figure 18: Demonstration of selecting an APK to decompile 
 
 
Now, we convert the APK file to a jar file. To do that, we select the APK to JAR button (step 
(b)). In order to decompile the APK file, we use the command lines from the open source 
dex2jar utility ("dex2jar", 2013). Dex2jar is a very useful tool for extracting source code of 
mobile applications. It is also capable of maintaining the integrity of the folder structure. Once 
the process is complete, we can go back to the file browser and see that Zitmo-dex2jar.jar has 







Figure 19: Verification that APK file was converted to jar file  
 
 
Now, we initiate the Extract Source button (step (c)). The contents of Zitmo-dex2jar.jar are 
extracted, and the Java class files are generated.  Figure 20 shows a screenshot where the jar file 
is converted to Java class files. The next step is to convert all .class files into .java files using the 
JD-GUI ("Java Decompiler", 2013). 
 
 




5.3 Analysis of the Source Code 
We implemented a prototype Java class, TestAndroidKLD.java that analyzes the decompiled 
APK files at the Java code level and can compute the occurrence probability of elements of 




TestAndroidKLD.java has a method, scanJavaFile(File file), that checks the main Zitmo 
directory and each of its subdirectories for java files. Each of those java files is then scanned and 
checked for the occurrence of the elements of population.  For example, f1, explained in Table 4, 
refers to an SMS message being sent with visual input. scanJavaFile(File file) checks for the 
presence of setContentView(); if it is present, that is an indication of a benign action.  
 
Table 16: Output of Method Call Occurrence for the P Set (Part 1) 
 




1 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_Android-Send-
SMS-Example 1 0 1 1 1 1 
SMS_AndroidSMSExa
mple_1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
SMS_AndroidSMSExa
mple_2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_apriorit_SecureMe
ssages 1 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_Cloud SMS 15 20 0 2 17 5 
SMS_Free SMS India 11 0 0 2 5 5 
SMS_GO SMS Pro 20 52 0 12 599 24 
SMS_Handcent SMS 4 17 0 11 404 28 
SMS_javacodegeeks_An
droidSMSExample_1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
SMS_MightyText.src 9 0 0 0 0 16 
SMS_mkyong-Android-




1 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_msatpathy_SMST
est 1 0 1 1 1 6 
SMS_Ninja SMS 9 22 0 0 16 0 
SMS_SecureMessages 1 0 1 0 1 0 
SMS_SMSTest 1 0 1 1 1 6 










Table 17: Output of Method Call Occurrence for the P Set (Part 2) 
 
Application sendTextMessage Const arg Var arg Intent putExtra (sms_body) 
SMS_Android-Build-In-
SMS-Application-Example 0 0 0 1 1 
SMS_Android-Send-SMS-
Example 1 0 1 0 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample
_1 1 0 1 0 0 
SMS_AndroidSMSExample
_2 0 0 0 1 0 
SMS_apriorit_SecureMessa
ges 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_Cloud SMS 1 0 1 0 0 
SMS_Free SMS India 3 2 1 0 0 
SMS_GO SMS Pro 3 1 2 0 0 
SMS_Handcent SMS 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_javacodegeeks_Androi
dSMSExample_1 1 0 1 0 0 
SMS_MightyText.src 4 0 4 0 0 
SMS_mkyong-Android-




0 0 0 1 1 
SMS_msatpathy_SMSTest 2 0 2 1 1 
SMS_Ninja SMS 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_SecureMessages 0 0 0 0 0 
SMS_SMSTest 2 0 2 1 1 
Total 19 3 16 5 4 
 
 
The P set computation requires adding up of all the fi counts from all sample applications. A 
counter keeps track of each element's occurrence. While TestAndroidKLD.java scans the source 
code, it creates and writes all data to a CSV file. Tables 16 and 17 show the generated outputs 




5.4 Reviewing the Obtained Results 
The first two steps, mentioned in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, are repeated for multiple mobile 
applications that have the same type of functionality. By evaluating a large number of 
applications, we are able to prevent KLD values from being skewed too heavily in one direction.  
Using the values generated in the CSV file, we can compare the known good and malicious KLD 
values. First, we calculate the final tabulation for each element in the population set, as shown in 




Currently, our KLD-based approach is being executed as a desktop application. The average time 
to build our P set was a total of 0.146 seconds. The average time to build our malicious Q set 
was a total of 0.153 seconds. The average time to build our benign Q set was a total of 0.113 
seconds. These average times are considered to be fairly efficient since they do not require an 
excessive amount of time to analyze the chosen applications and generate the CSV file that 
tracks the occurrence of the population elements. This performance would change once 
transitioning from an offline desktop application to a running service on a mobile device. 
 
5.6 Deployment 
The offline analysis of scanning Android applications does not require an Internet connection. 
However, as malicious activities continue to evolve, the P set would require updating. Our initial 
intention for the deployment phase was to distribute the approach as a running service on the 
Android device. After careful consideration, we realized that the large variety of device hardware 
would affect the consistency of implementation and efficiency. The added constraint of declining 
battery power and device lifespan would deter users from running our service on their devices. In 
our future research, we plan to deploy our approach as a service in the cloud environment in 
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Android Malware Detection Using Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
Vanessa N. Cooper, Hisham M. Haddad, and Hossain Shahriar. 



















Many recent reports suggest that malware applications cause high billing to victims by 
sending and receiving of hidden SMS messages Given that, there is a need to develop 
necessary technique to identify malicious SMS operations as well as differentiate between 
good and bad SMS operations within applications. In this paper, we apply Kullback-Leibler 
Divergence (KLD) as a distance to identify the difference between good and malicious SMS 
operations. We develop a set of elements that represent sending or receiving of SMS 
messages both legitimately and maliciously. Then, we compare the divergence of the trained 
set of elements. Our evaluation shows that the divergence between good and bad 
applications remains significantly high, whereas between two applications performing the 
same SMS operations remain low. We evaluate the proposed KLD-based concept for 
identifying a set of malware applications. The initial results show that our approach can 
identify all known malware and has less false positive warning. 
57 
 
Development and Mitigation of Malicious Android Applications 
Vanessa N. Cooper, Hossain Shahriar, and Hisham M. Haddad.  
Book Chapter. Contribution to the book titled Handbook of Research on Digital Crime, 
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A Survey of Android Malware Characteristics and Mitigation Techniques 
Vanessa N. Cooper, Hossain Shahriar, and Hisham M. Haddad.  
Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Information 









As mobile applications are being developed at a faster pace, the security aspect of user 
information is being neglected. A compromised smartphone can inflict severe damage to both 
users and the cellular service provider. Malware on a smartphone can make the phone 
partially or fully unusable; cause unwanted billing; steal private information; or infect every 
name in a user’s phonebook. A solid understanding of the characteristics of malware is the 
beginning step to prevent much of the unwanted consequences. This chapter is intended to 
provide an overview of security threats posed by Android malware. In particular, we focus on 
the characteristics commonly found in malware applications and understand the code level 
features that allow us to detect the malicious signatures. We also discuss some common 
defense techniques to mitigate the impact of malware applications.  
Abstract 
As mobile applications are being developed at a faster pace, the security aspect of is being 
neglected. A solid understanding of the characteristics of malware is the first step to 
preventing many unwanted consequences. This paper provides an overview of popular 
security threats posed by Android malware. In particular, we focus on the characteristics 
commonly found in malware applications and understand the code level features that can 
enable detection techniques. We also discuss some common defense techniques to mitigate 
the impact of malware applications. 
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Study of Agility in Mobile Application Development 
Vanessa N. Cooper and Hisham M. Haddad.  
Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of the International Conference on Software Engineering 






A recent study shows that more than 50% of mobile devices running Google's Android mobile 
operating system (OS) have unpatched vulnerabilities, opening them up to malicious 
applications and malware attacks. The starting point of becoming a potential victim due to 
malware is to allow the installation of applications without knowing in advance the operations 
that an application can perform. In particular, many recent reports suggest that malware 
applications caused unwanted billing by sending SMS messages to premium numbers without 
the knowledge of the victim [1,2]. Given that, there is a need for techniques to identify 
malicious behaviors of applications before installing them. 
 
Abstract 
Not only has Agility infiltrated enterprise and consumer mobile application development, 
but it has also become an integral part of most IT departments and the standard for younger 
generation developers. Despite the numerous benefits of Agile development, software 
developers often find out that there are also several pitfalls to avoid during mobile 
application development. In this study, we will explore the potential pitfalls of incorporating 
agility into the development of mobile applications. The motivation behind this work stems 








Conclusion and Future Work 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
This thesis provides an overview of security threats posed by Android malware. We discuss the 
overall structure of the Android OS and how its security features attempt to prevent malware 
attacks. We also discuss the details of Android’s privacy features and overall architecture. We 
discuss three different types of malware (grayware, spyware, and malware) and how they affect 
Android security. In particular, we focus on the characteristics commonly found in malware 
applications and understand the code level features that allow us to detect the malicious 
signatures. In addition, our examination of the code level demonstrates the likelihood of an 
Android application’s malicious activities by those specific method signatures. 
 
We also discuss some common defense techniques to mitigate the impact of malware 
applications. Those defense techniques are as follows: sandboxing, machine learning algorithms, 
decompiler-based static analysis, and secure software architecture for Android applications. A 
secure Android operating system and better coding practices will greatly reduce the possibilities 
of Android malware. These defense techniques enhance the security of the Android platform and 
deployed applications. We discuss both the advantages and disadvantages of each of these 
techniques.  
 
In this thesis, we propose to choose the Kullback-Liebler Divergence (KLD) as a measurement 
to differentiate between legitimate and malicious application behavior at source code level. The 
methodology builds probability distributions from the available source code of an application 
performing a specific functionality. We show some highlights of choosing possible elements of 
interest that can be useful to differentiate between a benign and malicious application behavior. 
Then, we apply the KLD measure to show that the difference between a legitimate and malicious 
application is infinite, whereas the difference between two legitimate applications is close to 




We also develop a prototype application that can partially automate the decompiling process of 
the APK file before computing the occurrence probability. We address the detection of malicious 
SMS operations within malware based on a set of proposed elements that can be used to build 
population for computing KLD. Furthermore, to address the elements having zero probability, 
we propose to apply constant back-off smoothing technique. We evaluated our approach using a 
set of known good applications to build one population set followed by a set of malware 
applications obtained from the web. The results show that KLD between good and malware 
applications are high and ranges from 12.47 to 17.25.  In addition, we also measured the KLD 
between the trained applications and another set of good applications, and found that the KLD 
between good and good applications may range from 5.12 to 17.25. Based on the study of 
Android malware, we conclude that there should be a pair of threshold values for identifying 
malware applications using KLD. In our evaluation, only one good application has been labeled 
as malware (false positive).  
 
 We believe that the application of KLD is very practical and simply deduces the elements of 
population for each functionality type into a threshold of values (which can identify a simple 
pass/fail). False positives were also investigated to ensure that the range of values is correct for 
both benign and malignant applications. We conclude that our application implementation of the 
KLD method accounts for more mitigation techniques. By examining the Android Manifest file 
(permission analysis), we can determine the intended functionality of each application and 
automatically generate its elements of population from a predetermined list. Using that 
information, our static analysis of the source code will yield more accurate results by checking 
for obfuscated code. Also, this is being done in an isolated environment (sandboxing) and the 
application is not being dynamically executed which greatly reduces risk of infection. 
 
7.2 Future Work 
Our future research includes theoretical and implementation goals. On the theoretical side, our 
goals are: (i) choosing an appropriate smoothing technique to practically compute KLD, when 
one of the elements occurrence probability is found to be zero, (ii) finding more elements of 
population to cover more cases, (iii) documenting all possible known code patterns for 
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performing specific functionality of interests that are common in malware applications, and (iv) 
validating our hypothesis using a larger collection of sample Android applications consisting of 
both legitimate and malicious behaviors. 
 
On the implementation side, the conditions that we used to check the occurrence of population 
elements may not be exhaustive and accurate for all types of malware activities. However, we 
plan to create an interface where the end user can specify the population elements based on the 
activity. Our future goal includes automating the process for decompiling the APK file and 
analyzing the source code. We also plan to research the possibilities of deploying the application 
















public class TestAndroidKLD { 
 
public static int scanJavaFile (File file){ 
  
 int store=0; 
   
 try{ 
  
 FileInputStream fstream = new 
 FileInputStream(file.getAbsolutePath().toString()); 
    
 DataInputStream in = new DataInputStream(fstream); 
   
 BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in)); 
    
 String str; 
  
 while ((str = br.readLine()) != null) { 
     
 if ((str.indexOf(" Activity") > 0) && str.indexOf(" class ") > 0 ){ 
  result[0]++;     
  store=1; 
 } 
     
 if ((str.indexOf(" View") > 0) && str.indexOf(" class ") > 0 ){ 
  result[1]++;      
  store=2; 
 } 
     
 if ((str.indexOf("setContentView") > 0) &&  
 (str.indexOf("R.layout.main") > 0)){ 
  result[2]++;      
  System.out.println ("setContentView() stmt: " + str);  
  store=3;  
 } 
  
 if ((str.indexOf("getText().toString()") > 0) && store==5){ 
  result[3]++; 
  System.out.println ("getText() call within event handler stmt: 
" + str);  






         
 if ((str.indexOf("public void on") > 0) && (str.indexOf("View ") > 
0)  
      && !str.contains(",")){   
   
  result[4]++; 
  System.out.println ("event handler stmt: " + str);  
  store=5; 
 } 
     
 if (str.indexOf("SmsManager") > 0 && !(str.indexOf("import") >= 0)){ 
  result [5]++; 
  System.out.println ("SmsManager stmt: "+ str); 
  store=6; 
 } 
     
 if (str.indexOf("sendTextMessage") > 0 ){ 
  result [6]++; 
  System.out.println ("sendTextMessage () stmt: "+ str); 
  store=7; 
 } 
 
 if ((str.indexOf("sendTextMessage") > 0 ) && str.contains("\"")){  
  result [7]++; 
  System.out.println ("constant argument in sendTextMessage (): 
"+ str); 
  store=8; 
 } 
 
 if ((str.indexOf("sendTextMessage") > 0 ) && !str.contains("\"")){  
  result [8]++; 
  System.out.println ("variable argument in sendTextMessage (): 
"+ str); 
  store=9; 
 } 
 
 if (str.indexOf("Intent") > 0 && str.indexOf("new ") > 0 && 
str.indexOf("=") > 0 && str.indexOf("Intent.ACTION_VIEW") > 0 ){  
      
  result [9]++; //intent++;      
  System.out.println ("Intent creation stmt: "+ str); 
  store=10; 
} 
 
if (str.indexOf("sendIntent.putExtra") > 0 && str.indexOf("sms_body") > 0 
){ 
 result [10]++;  
 store=11; 
 System.out.println ("sms using Intent stmt: "+ str); 
 if (!str.contains("\"")){ 
  System.out.println ("variable sms stmt: "+ str); 








 if (str.indexOf("sendIntent.putExtra") > 0 && 
str.indexOf("sms_body") > 0 ){ 
  result [10]++;  
  store=11; 
  System.out.println ("sms using Intent stmt: "+ str); 
  if (!str.contains("\"")){ 
    System.out.println ("variable sms stmt: "+ str); 
    result [11]++; 
  } 
  if (str.contains("\"")){ 
    System.out.println ("const sms stmt: "+ str); 
    result [12]++; 
  } 
 } 
     
     
 if (str.indexOf("startActivity") > 0 ){ 
  result [13]++; 
  store=12; 
  if (str.indexOf("Uri.parse") > 0){ 
   result [14]++;  
      
   System.out.println ("Activity with Uri stmt: "+ str); 
      
   if (str.indexOf("smsto:") > 0){ 
    result [15]++; 
       
    System.out.println ("Activity with Uri and smsto 
stmt: "+ str); 
      
    String msg = 
str.substring(str.indexOf("smsto:")+2, str.length()-1); 
    if (!msg.contains("\"")){ 
     result [16]++; 
     System.out.println ("Activity with Uri, 
smsto with variable msg: "+ str); 
    } 
     (msg.contains("\"")){ 
     result [17]++; 
     System.out.println ("Activity with Uri, 
smsto with const msg: "+ str); 
    } 
   }  
  }  
 } 
 
 if (str.indexOf("Toast.makeText") > 0 && str.indexOf("SMS") >0 ){ 
  System.out.println ("Toast.makeText stmt: "+ str); 
  result [18]++; 
 } 





  if (str.indexOf("RESULT") > 0 && str.indexOf("SMS") >0 ){ 
   System.out.println ("Result notification for SmsManager 
stmt: "+ str); 
   result [19]++; 
  } 
     
 } 
 in.close(); 
    
 }catch (Exception e){ //Catch exception if any 
   System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage()); 
  } 
  return store; 
 } 
  
 public static void walk( String path ) { 
 
        File root = new File( path ); 
        File[] list = root.listFiles(); 
         
        if (list == null) return; 
 
        for (File f : list) { 
            if (f.isDirectory()) { 
                
                walk(f.getAbsolutePath()); 
            } 
         if (f.getName().endsWith("java")){ 
             fcount++; 
            } 
          
        } 
    } 
 
 public static int fcount=0, dcount =0, imgCount=0; 
 public static int activityCount=0, viewCount=0;  
 public static int obs1_getText=0; 
 public static int intent=0, settype_sms=0, uriparse=0; 
 public static int startActivityWithContext=0, 
startActivityNoContext=0, putExtra=0;  
 public static int smsto=0, smsmanager=0, sendtxtmsg=0; 







static String csvFile = "C:\\Users\\TechDev\\Desktop\\KLD_Results.csv"; 
 static String header[] =  
 {"Application", "Activity", "View",  
  "setContentView()", "getText()", "EventHandler", //obs1(ben): sms 
is sent with visual input and through even handler method  
  "SmsManager", "sendTextMessage", "Const arg", //obs2(mal): 
SmsManager object is created, sendTxtMsg is invoked, constant arg present 
  "Var arg", //obs3 (ben): SmsManager object is created, sendTxtMsg 
is invoked, variable arg present 
  "Intent", "putExtra(sms_body)", "variable SMS", //obs4 (ben): 
using intent object, putting sms body, and variable is used for message 
  "Constant SMS", //obs5 (mal): using intent, constant sms message  
  "StartActivity", "Uri.parse", "smsto:", "Uri_variable SMS", //obs6 
(ben): start activity with smsto uri and variable param (ben) 
  "Uri_const SMS", //obs7 (mal): start activity with smsto uri and 
const param 
  "Toast", "SmsManager.RESULT" //obs8(ben): result is notified 
SmsManager based msg delivery 
   
  //"StartActivity_NoContext" //obs7 (mal): start activity with no 
context  
   
 }; 
 static int [] result = new int [20]; 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
   
  int appcount=0; 
   
  String path = "C:\\Users\\TechDev\\Desktop\\SMS_sample"; 
  String appName=""; 
  writeHeader(header, csvFile); 
   
  File root = new File( path ); 
         File[] list = root.listFiles(); 
         
         if (list == null) return; 
 
  for (File f : list) { 
            if ( f.isDirectory() ) { 
             appcount++; 
                 System.out.println( "\n****Dir:" + f.getAbsoluteFile() 
); 
                 String temp = f.getName(); 
                 StringTokenizer stk = new StringTokenizer (temp, "\\");   
                 while (stk.hasMoreTokens()){ 
                  appName = stk.nextToken(); 
 
    fcount= dcount = imgCount= 
activityCount=viewCount =      
 intent=settype_sms=0; 
                  startActivityWithContext = startActivityNoContext 
=       putExtra = uriparse= 0; 
                  smsto= smsmanager=sendtxtmsg=0; 





 walk( f.getAbsolutePath()); 
                generateCsvFile(csvFile, appName, result); 
                 
                for (int i =0; i<result.length; i++){  
                 result[i] =0; 
                } 
                               
            } 
        } 
         
        System.out.println( "\nApplication count:" + appcount); 
   
 } 
 public static void writeHeader(String [] header, String csvFile){ 
   
  try{ 
     FileWriter writer = new FileWriter(csvFile, true); 
 
     for (int i =0; i< header.length; i++){ 
       writer.append(header[i] + ","); 
         
      } 
      writer.append ("\n"); 
     writer.flush(); 
     writer.close(); 
  } 
  catch(IOException e) 
  { 
       e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private static void generateCsvFile(String sFileName, String 
appName,  int result[]){ 
  try{ 
      FileWriter writer = new FileWriter(sFileName, true); 
      writer.append(appName+ ","); 
      for (int i =0; i<result.length; i++){ 
       writer.append (result[i] + ","); 
      }  
      writer.append('\n'); 
  
      writer.flush(); 
      writer.close(); 
  } 
  catch(IOException e){ 
       e.printStackTrace(); 
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